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Abstract 
 
In light of the 2010 Review Conference of the Rome Statute not only the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) itself but also the support of the European Union (EU) for the 
Court must stand up to scrutiny. To what extent has it been effective? This paper 
elaborates a tailor-made yardstick to measure ‘effectiveness’ and then follows a 
two-pronged approach. First, it scrutinises the Union’s support for the ICC, showing 
that, despite numerous challenges, the EU’s policy of broadening, strengthening and 
deepening the Rome Statute system has become more effective in the last decade. 
Second, it evaluates the effectiveness of the ICC itself, commending its relatively 
advanced institutional set-up, its growing socio-democratic legitimacy and its 
relative independence from political interference, while pointing to its suboptimal 
efficiency, its difficult cooperation with relevant partners and the delicate inclusion 
of elements of restorative justice. The results of this review lead to six policy 
recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of the EU’s promotion of the ICC. 
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1.  Introduction: effective EU support for the ICC?† 
 
The 2010 Review Conference took stock of the turbulent years of the 
International Criminal Court since the entry into force of the Rome Statute in 2002.1 
Marking the ‘beginning of a new era in international law’,2 in which the concept of 
personal immunity no longer shields state officials from prosecution for genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes,3 the ICC has rapidly evolved alongside 
international developments. On 4 March 2009, the issuance of an arrest warrant4 
against the incumbent head of state of Sudan, Omar al Bashir, caused significant 
diplomatic hassle. On 31 March 2010, a pre-trial chamber granted the request of the 
Prosecutor to open investigations into 2007 post-election violence in Kenya;5 for the 
first time, the Prosecutor initiated investigations proprio motu.6 On 1 November 2010, 
the Seychelles became the 112th state party of the Rome Statute.7 In the near future, 
the phasing out of the ad hoc tribunals, that is the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), will raise questions concerning the future of international criminal justice.  
In these interesting times, not only the ICC itself but also the support of the 
European Union8 for the Court must stand up to scrutiny. The ICC is sometimes 
described as an ‘EU Court’9 – but is the ICC really a European ‘success story‘? To 
what extent has the EU’s support for the ICC been effective?  
To answer this question, chapter 2 elaborates a tailor-made yardstick to 
measure effectiveness, providing a basis for the following two-pronged approach: 
First, chapter 3 scrutinises the EU’s support for the ICC. Prior research in this field has 
mainly concentrated on the ratification process. This paper adopts a more 
                                                 
†  The author would like to thank Prof. Monica den Boer for her valuable guidance and the 
interviewees for their remarkably sincere and direct answers. All electronic resources were 
last retrieved on 22 December 2010. 
1   International  Criminal  Court,  Review Conference, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/ 
ReviewConference/Review+Conference.htm.  
2   N. Deitelhoff, “Deliberating CFSP: European Foreign Policy and the International Criminal 
Court”, RECON Online Working Paper, no. 10, 2008, p. 1.  
3   Art. 27 Rome Statute.  
4    International Criminal Court, Case The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/Go?id=90ee1a29-75c8-4834-8b34-56355b0c35f8&lan=en-GB. 
5   International Criminal Court, ICC judges grant the Prosecutor’s request, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/exeres/D81AA5AF-CD76-4B3C-A4FC-AA7819569B44.htm. 
6   See Art. 13-15 Rome Statute.  
7   International  Criminal  Court,  Seychelles, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/BAA909C9-
3E7B-4156-ACA0-B63225DC8E40.htm. 
8   Although this paper sometimes refers to the member states of the EU, it focuses on the EU 
itself, which is not a signatory of the Rome Statute. 
9   M. Groenleer & D. Rijks, “The European Union and the International Criminal Court: The 
Politics of International Justice”, in K. Jørgensen (ed.), The European Union and 
International Organizations, London, Routledge, 2009, p. 167. 
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comprehensive approach, arguing that the EU’s support for the broadening, 
strengthening and deepening of the Rome Statute system has become more 
coherent and more effective in the last decade despite its numerous challenges and 
shortcomings. Second, fuelled by the idea that support for the ICC must consider the 
actual set-up and functioning of the Court and take account of the beneficiary’s 
needs, chapter 4 evaluates the effectiveness of the ICC itself. It faces two major 
challenges, namely the politico-legal complexity of the matter and the lack of 
empirical data. On the one hand, this paper has to disregard the historical 
development of international criminal justice10 and substantive provisions.11 It can 
only focus on a couple of core procedural elements to measure the effectiveness of 
the Court. On the other hand, the ICC remains a ‘justice start-up’.12 By 2010, eight 
years after the entry into force of the Rome Statute, investigations into the situations 
in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, 
Sudan and Kenya, and two trials against three Congolese nationals have been 
opened but not a single trial has been concluded yet. The evaluation of 
effectiveness as outlined in this paper will therefore be a provisional one. 
Nevertheless, the first years of a new institution are decisive for its future 
development. This evaluation must thus take emerging trends of the ICC into 
account. It demonstrates that the ICC has the potential to fight impunity effectively if 
it overcomes a number of policy dilemmas. Drawing on these findings, the 
conclusion presents six policy recommendations for a more effective European 
support for the ICC.   
 
 
2.  A tailor-made yardstick to measure effectiveness 
 
  To what extent does the EU’s support for the ICC qualify as a success story? 
In order to answer this question, it is first necessary to determine how to measure 
‘success’13 or ‘effectiveness’, the latter term being more commonly used in political 
                                                 
10   See A. Cassese, “From Nuremberg to Rome: International Military Tribunals to the 
International Criminal Court”, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002,   
pp. 4-15.  
11   Art. 5-9, 22-33 Rome Statute.  
12    C. Chung, in The Reckoning: The Battle for the International Criminal Court, P. Yates, 
Skylight Pictures, 2009.  
13   Identical to the definition of effectiveness, a common definition of success reads: “the 
achieving of the results wanted or hoped for“, Cambridge Advanced Learner’s 
Dictionary, success, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/success.  
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science. Both the ordinary meaning of effectiveness14 as well as its use in public 
policy analysis15 refer, simply put, to the actual implementation of one’s objectives.  
  In an attempt to provide for a transparent goal-achievement analysis, the 
following sections will make the objectives of the actors involved explicit, and 
systematise and deconstruct them in order to identify different points of reference on 
the yardstick of effectiveness. They elaborate a tailor-made framework to measure 
the effectiveness of the EU’s support for the ICC and of the work of the ICC itself. This 
will allow for the comparison of objectives with actual implementation in chapters 3 
and 4.  
 
2.1   A yardstick to measure the effectiveness of the EU’s support for the ICC  
 
Various ways are conceivable to systematise the EU’s declared objectives. This 
paper takes the ‘recipient’s view’ as a reference point. During a speech in 2010, the 
President of the ICC identified three main areas in which states parties and partners 
can contribute to the ICC: the broadening, strengthening and deepening of the 
Rome Statute system.16 ‘Broadening’ refers to the addition of new states parties to 
the Rome Statute.17 ‘Strengthening’ relates to enhanced cooperation of partners 
with the ICC by arresting suspects, blocking their bank accounts and liaising with the 
I C C  i n  o t h e r  f i e l d s  a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  r o u t i n e . 18 ‘Deepening’ corresponds to the 
empowerment of national jurisdictions to deal with mass atrocities at the domestic 
level.19  
The EU’s declared objectives, as expressed in the Council Common Positions 
of 200120, 200221 and 2003,22 and as specified in the Action Plan of 2004,23 can be 
categorised according to this trichotomy:  
                                                 
14    See Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, effectiveness, http://dictionary. 
cambridge.org/dictionary/british/effective_1. 
15   K. Jørgensen, “The European Union's Performance in World Politics: How Should We 
Measure Success?”, European University Institute Working Papers Robert Schuman Centre, 
no. 69, 1997, p. 3.  
16   S. Song, President of the ICC, speech and panel discussion, The Future Development of 
International Criminal Justice: An Interdisciplinary Approach, Bruges, College of Europe, 
15 April 2010.  
17   Ibid.  
18   Ibid.  
19   Ibid.  
20   Council of the European Union, Council Common Position 2001/443/CFSP of 11 June 2001 
on the International Criminal Court (CP 2001/443/CFSP), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cmsUpload/icc0en.pdf. 
21   Council of the European Union, Council Common Position 2002/474/CFSP of 20 June 2002 
on the International Criminal Court (CP 2002/474/CFSP), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cmsUpload/ICC25EN.pdf. 
6 EU Diplomacy Papers 1/2011 
1.  As regards ‘broadening’, the first Council Common Position called for an 
early entry into force of the Rome Statute.24 The subsequent documents 
were more ambitious, seeking to advance ‘universal participation’ both in 
the Rome Statute25 and in the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities 
of the Court (APIC).26  
2.  As to ‘strengthening’, the Union and the member states shall ensure 
‘cooperation with the Court in accordance with the Rome Statute’.27  
3.  With regard to ‘deepening’, EU member states shall ‘share with all 
interested States their own experience’28 and lend political,29 technical 
and financial30 support to third countries.  
Having outlined the criteria for chapter 3, this paper will now turn to those to 
be applied in chapter 4.  
 
2.2   A yardstick to measure the effectiveness of the ICC  
 
Following the goal-achievement approach used above, this paper takes the 
objectives expressed in the Rome Statute itself as a starting point to measure the 
effectiveness of the ICC. The preamble to the Rome Statute, reflecting the objectives 
of the states parties and thus the mandate of the ICC itself, indicates some elements 
essential for the effective working of the ICC: international cooperation shall ensure 
the ‘effective prosecution’ of the most serious crimes,31 enforce international 
justice,32 and put an end to impunity.33  
In order to substantiate these objectives, this paper draws upon prior 
systematisations developed to measure the democratic legitimacy of institutions. 
Scharpf in particular distinguishes between input-oriented and output-oriented 
                                                 
22   Council of the European Union, Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP of 16 June 2003 
on the International Criminal Court (CP 2003/444/CFSP), http://consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cmsUpload/l_15020030618en00670069.pdf. 
23    Council of the European Union, Action Plan of 4 February 2004  to follow-up on the 
Common Position on the International Criminal Court (AP 2004), http://www.consilium. 
europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ICC48EN.pdf. 
24   Art. 1.2, CP 2001/443/CFSP. 
25   AP 2004, p. 5; Art. 1.2 CP 2002/474/CFSP. 
26   Art. 3, CP 2003/444/CFSP. 
27   Art. 5 CP 2003/444/CFSP; see AP 2004, p. 5. 
28   Art. 2.3 CP 2001/443/CFSP. 
29   AP 2004, p. 6. 
30   Art. 2.3 CP 2002/474/CFSP. 
31   Preamble 4 Rome Statute.  
32   Preamble 11 Rome Statute.  
33   Preamble 5 Rome Statute.  
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criteria.34 On the one hand, input-oriented criteria refer to ‘government by the 
people’, that is to mechanisms of participation and consensus.35  Den Boer, 
Hillebrand and Nölke distinguish between democratic36, legal37 and social38 
legitimacy. On the other hand, output-oriented criteria relate to ‘government for the 
people’, that is to the capacity to solve problems requiring collective solutions.39 Den 
Boer, Hillebrand and Nölke distinguish the elements of efficiency and effectiveness.40  
These concepts, developed to measure the democratic legitimacy of 
institutions at the national or supranational level, may only be applied mutatis 
mutandis to courts set up by multilateral treaties between states. Unlike national or 
supranational institutions, the ICC is part of the international judiciary: its set-up 
outside the framework of any state or any other international organisation41 and the 
granting of international legal personality42 shall ensure its independence and the 
fair trial of the accused. Furthermore, its different organs43 fulfil a multitude of 
different tasks, which do not parallel the national understanding of separation of 
powers, namely representative (the Presidency44), judicial (the Appeals, Trial and Pre-
Trial Divisions45), executive (the Office of the Prosecutor46) and administrative tasks 
(the Registry47). Additionally, the Court has significantly less executive powers than 
national or supranational institutions, as it relies entirely on the cooperation of states 
to prosecute the most serious crimes and enforce decisions and sentences.48  
Acknowledging that an exhaustive evaluation of the ICC is beyond its scope, 
this paper identifies a set of six core elements crucial to measure the effectiveness of 
the Court. First, three input-oriented core elements contribute to the effectiveness of 
the Court: its institutional set-up, socio-democratic legitimacy and independence.  
                                                 
34   F.  Scharpf,  Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1999, p. 6. 
35   Ibid., p. 7.  
36   M. den Boer, C. Hillebrand & A. Nölke, “Legitimacy under Pressure: The European Web of 
Counter-Terrorism Networks”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 46, no. 1, 2008, 
p.  105. The authors mention parliamentary control over policy plans and budgets and 
ministerial accountability as criteria.  
37   Ibid., p. 107. The authors mention the adoption of a binding legal instrument and 
mechanisms of legal accountability and judicial redress as indicators.  
38   Ibid., p. 108. The authors mention transparency, independent monitoring and the inclusion 
of citizens in consultation and debate as elements.  
39   Scharpf, op.cit., p. 11.  
40   Den Boer, Hillebrand & Nölke, op.cit., p. 104.  
41   Art. 2 Rome Statute.  
42   Art. 4 Rome Statute.  
43   Art. 34 Rome Statute.  
44   Art. 38 Rome Statute.  
45   Art. 39 Rome Statute.  
46   Art. 42 Rome Statute.  
47   Art. 43 Rome Statute.  
48   Art. 86-111 Rome Statute.  
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1.  The most important criteria for the institutional set-up of the Court, which 
provides the framework for the understanding of the other five core 
elements, are its legal status, its competences and its composition.  
2.  As to the socio-democratic legitimacy of the Court, which enhances its 
worldwide acceptance, the participation rate in the Rome Statute, the 
transparency of ICC procedures and its monitoring mechanisms are taken 
into account.  
3.  The independence of a court from political interference allows for its 
recognition as being super partes and is therefore a crucial element for its 
effectiveness. It can be measured by evaluating the trigger mechanisms to 
open investigations, the provisions to safeguard the neutrality of the judges 
and the prosecutor, and the hierarchy between the ICC and national 
jurisdictions.  
Second, three output-oriented elements, difficult to assess for the reasons 
indicated above, are also indicators of the Court’s effectiveness: its efficiency, its 
proper cooperation with relevant partners, and its potential contribution to conflict 
resolution.  
4.  Efficiency, decisive for any international bureaucracy to justify the 
contributions of all stakeholders to its budget, refers to the use of resources 
needed for the organisation and functioning of the Court.49  
5.  States, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the United Nations (UN) 
and arguably the ICTY are the most relevant partners for the ICC. Their 
cooperation with the ICC, essential for a court that depends entirely on 
other actors to implement its decisions,50 may be assessed by considering 
the relevant legal provisions and the practice of cooperation.  
6.  As the ICC has not concluded any trial yet, its contribution to conflict 
resolution, i.e. its raison d’être, is particularly difficult to assess. Yet, 
considering the broader discussion on and the deterrent effect of 
international criminal justice, its potential to resolve conflicts by including 
victim communities and elements of restorative justice may be taken into 
account.  
Figure 1 summarises the indicators for these six core elements to measure the 
effectiveness of the ICC.  
                                                 
49    See M. Dakolias, Court Performance around the World: A Comparative Perspective, 
World Bank Technical Paper no. 430, July 1999, Washington, D.C., World Bank, p. 5, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BRAZILINPOREXTN/Resources/3817166-1185895645304/ 
4044168-1186404259243/14pub_br176.pdf.  
50   Art. 86-111 Rome Statute. 
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Figure 1: The effectiveness of the ICC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s own chart. 
 
In addition to the goal-achievement analysis, the comparison with other 
actors is also a widespread tool to measure effectiveness.51 This paper refers to the 
comparative method mainly in order to compensate for the lack of empirical data 
on cooperation and conflict resolution. It points to particularities of the ICC vis-à-vis 
the ICTY, set up in 1993 as the first UN ad hoc tribunal, whenever appropriate. The 
case of the ICTY seems particularly interesting because its jurisdiction ratione 
temporis52 theoretically allows for a clash of competences with the ICC, which may 
deal with ‘residual issues’53 after the phasing out of the ICTY.54  
Having designed and disclosed the yardstick, this paper now applies it to the 
EU’s support (chapter 3) and the ICC itself (chapter 4).  
                                                 
51   Jørgensen, op.cit., p. 9.  
52   Art. 1, 8 ICTY Statute.  
53   ICTY, Assessing the Legacy of the ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/10293. 
54   A comparison with other courts, such as the ICTR, other international courts such as the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and 
national or hybrid tribunals, is excluded on purpose. 
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3.  The EU’s support for the ICC: mission accomplished? 
 
This chapter applies the yardstick developed in chapter 2 to evaluate to what 
extent the EU’s policy to broaden, strengthen and deepen the Rome Statute system 
is effective, identifying several conflicting objectives that constrain a more effective 
support.  
 
3.1   Broadening the Rome Statute system 
 
Differentiating between internal and external aspects, this section examines 
the effectiveness of the EU’s efforts to broaden the Rome Statute system by 
promoting universal ratification of the Rome Statute and the APIC.  
In the run-up to the Rome Conference in July 1998, European institutions stood 
on the sidelines whereas civil society actors, often under the leadership of the 
Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC), could exercise significant 
influence on international decision-making.55 Significant concessions, especially to 
the United Kingdom56 and France,57 were necessary to reach what slowly emerged 
as a European, and nearly global,58 consensus.  
Today, a uniform internal p o s i t i o n  a l l o w s  E U  m e m b e r  s t a t e s  t o  a c t  m o r e  
credibly as a collective entity.59 After the Czech Republic ratified the Rome Statute 
on 21 July 2009,60 all 27 EU member states are now states parties to the Rome Statute. 
EU-wide ratification allows the EU to combine the leverage of its member states in 
conformity with the motto ex unitate vires. The resolutions in support of the ICC, 
adopted annually by the United Nations General Assembly, and the Security 
                                                 
55   W. Pace & J. Schense, “The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations”, in A. Cassese et al. 
(eds.),  The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 111; and M. Glasius, “Does the Involvement of Global Civil 
Society Make International Decision-Making More Democratic? The Case of the 
International Criminal Court”, Journal of Civil Society, vol. 4, no. 1, 2008, p. 45.  
56   Art. 13(b) and Art. 16 Rome Statute.   
57   Art. 124 Rome Statute; see Deitelhoff, op.cit., p. 12; Groenleer & Rijks, op.cit., p. 175. The 
2010 Review Conference decided to retain this article in its current form, International 
Criminal Court, Article 124 of the Rome Statute, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/ 
asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.4-ENG.pdf. 
58    The Rome Statute was adopted with a “landslide majority” of 120 votes in favour, 7 
against and 21 abstentions, see P. Kirsch & D. Robinson, “Reaching Agreement at the 
Rome Conference”, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 77.  
59   Groenleer & Rijks, op.cit., p. 169.  
60   International Criminal Court, ASP welcomes the Czech Republic as the 110th new State 
Party, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/Press+Releases/Press+Releases+2009/PR457.htm. 
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Council’s deferral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC,61 are positive examples of EU 
policy coordination among member states.62 
However, concerns of state sovereignty continue to constrain the EU’s internal 
policy to some extent. First, the Czech Republic and Malta have not yet ratified the 
APIC,63 although its EU-wide ratification has been an official objective since 2003.64 
Additionally, the EU still lacks a unified position on the controversial issue of the crime 
of aggression65 – even after the 2010 Review Conference. Similarly, France and the 
United Kingdom do not always seem to honour their obligation66 to ‘defend the 
positions and interests of the Union’ in the Security Council: both countries have long 
supported the US in activating the deferral mechanism for personnel deployed in 
United Nations missions.67 In this context, EU coordination has proved to be rather 
reactive than proactive. This weakens the EU’s promotion of the ICC to the outside 
world. 
The EU’s external policy is more complex and controversial. In order to reveal 
a set of different competing objectives that constrain a more effective promotion of 
the ICC, the following section covers the most important forms of support, notably 
political declarations and dialogue, financial support and the use of ICC clauses.  
 
Political declarations and dialogue  
 
Political declarations and demarches are the most commonly used policy tool 
to encourage worldwide ratification of the Rome Statute and of the APIC. However, 
their concrete impact on the broadening of the Rome Statute system is 
questionable. One reason for this may be that they do not allow for the 
development of a genuine dialogue.  
A vast number of meetings and summits institutionalise the EU’s political 
dialogue with its partners. Virtually all agendas in fora of bi- and multilateral political 
                                                 
61    United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1593 of 31 March 2005, S/RES/1593 (2005), 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/292/73/PDF/N0529273.pdf.  
62   Council of the European Union, The European Union and the International Criminal Court, 
p. 15, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ICC_internet08.pdf.  
63   Interview with Rafael de Bustamante Tello, Council of the European Union, DG E IV United 
Nations and International Criminal Court, Brussels, 28 April 2010. 
64   Art. 3 CP 2003/444/CFSP. 
65   Interview with Rafael de Bustamante Tello, op.cit.  
66   Art. 34.2 Treaty on European Union. 
67   Art. 16 Rome Statute;  
see United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1422 of 12 July 2002, S/RES/1422 (2002), 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/477/61/PDF/N0247761.pdf; and 
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1487 of 12 June 2003, S/RES/1487 (2003), 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/394/51/PDF/N0339451.pdf.  
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dialogue feature the promotion of the ICC, albeit as a second-rate topic.68 Yet, the 
relevant passages in summit declarations are not legally binding, and they remain 
vague.69 Although some observers attribute the ratifications of the Rome Statute by 
Chad70 and Japan71 to the EU’s active promotion, it is not possible to establish a 
(mono-)causal relationship between the EU’s support and ratification by third 
countries.72 The complexity of today’s conduct of international relations and the 
variety of actors and interests involved may constitute two major reasons. In 
particular, ‘the added value of the EU as compared to single member states should 
not be over evaluated’.73 
At any rate, the analysis of bilateral dialogues evinces the importance of 
good diplomatic relations with strategic partners. The EU’s stated objective to 
achieve global ratification of the Rome Statute by raising the issue in negotiations 
with partners, ‘whenever appropriate’,74 may easily be sacrificed on the altar of 
bilateral  realpolitik, especially vis-à-vis great powers. The case of transatlantic 
relations illustrates this point. Ever since the US voted against the Rome Statute, the EU 
has first faced a US policy of open opposition under the Clinton and Bush 
administrations75 and then an informal policy of careful rapprochement termed 
‘positive engagement’ under the Obama administration, which, however, continues 
to refer to the opposition of the Senate to justify its wait-and-see attitude.76 Both sides 
mainly repeat their own positions and ‘agree to disagree’.77 This policy may be 
‘realistic’.78 However, as long as the inviolability of its good diplomatic relations with 
its strategic partners trumps its ICC policy, the EU will not oppose its strategic partners 
openly to broaden the Rome Statute system.  
 
                                                 
68   Council of the European Union, The EU and the ICC, op.cit., pp. 10-11. 
69   See European Commission, Joint Africa-EU Strategy, paragraph 30, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
development/icenter/repository/EAS2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf. 
70   S. Scheipers & D. Sicurelli, “Empowering Africa: Normative Power in EU-Africa Relations”, 
Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 15, no. 4, 2008, p. 612.  
71   Groenleer & Rijks, op.cit., p. 170.  
72   Interview with Rafael de Bustamante Tello, op.cit. 
73   Interview with interviewee C, senior official at the ICC, The Hague, 24 March 2010.  
74   Art. 2.1 CP 2003/444/CFSP. 
75   See, inter alia, the conclusion of more than 100 bilateral immunity agreements (BIAs, Art. 
98 Rome Statute) with states parties (despite Art. 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties), the 2002 ‘withdrawal’ of the US signature of the Rome Statute and the 
activation of the deferral mechanism (Art. 16 Rome Statute) for personnel deployed in UN 
missions (see fn. 67).  
76   Song, op.cit.; Interview with interviewee E, The Hague, 24 March 2010.  
77   Interview with Rafael de Bustamante Tello, op.cit. 
78   Interviews with interviewee A, senior official at the ICC; and interviewee C, op.cit. 
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Financial assistance  
 
Avoiding direct confrontation, the Commission furthers the broadening of the 
Rome Statute system in an indirect but effective manner. Since 1995, it has provided 
more than € 40 million under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR) for campaigns promoting the broadening of the Rome Statute 
system.79 P u t t i n g  u p  w i t h  t h e  r i s i n g  i n f l u e n c e  o f  N G O s  o n  t h e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  
process, it ensures an effective form of grassroots support helping to implement the 
Action Plan.  
 
ICC clauses  
 
Thanks to the economic strength of the European trading bloc, the 
Commission has considerable bargaining power in its negotiations with third 
countries. However, it generally refrains from imposing a policy of strict conditionality. 
Although the EU claims to ‘pursue systematically the inclusion of an ICC clause in the 
negotiating mandates and agreements with third countries’,80 the Commission 
seems to prefer a case-by-case approach.  
ional 
politic
                                                
On the one hand, the Commission has successfully included ICC clauses in 
agreements with less influential countries, such as the 79 ACP countries: the Cotonou 
Agreement, last revised in 2010,81 does include an ICC clause: ‘The Parties shall seek 
to take steps towards ratifying and implementing the Rome Statute and related 
instruments.’82 This clause may be relatively weak: first, it only obliges the Parties to 
‘seek to take steps’ in lieu of including an obligation to ratify and implement the 
Rome Statute, and the ‘related documents’ are not specified. Second, the ICC 
clause is not an ‘essential element’ of the agreement.83 Therefore, a refusal to ‘take 
steps’ cannot justify the suspension of certain provisions of the Cotonou 
Agreement.84 Third, the Commission has never envisaged applying aid conditionality 
in order to broaden the Rome Statute system.85 Yet, this new generation of ICC 
clauses, inserted in agreements with less influential countries, exerts addit
al pressure.  
 
79   European  Commission,  The International Criminal Court & the fight against impunity, 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/icc/index_en.htm. 
80   Council of the European Union, The EU and the ICC, op.cit., p. 13.  
81   European  Commission,  The Cotonou Agreement, http://ec.europa.eu/development/ 
geographical/cotonouintro_en.cfm.  
82   Art. 11.6 Cotonou Agreement.  
83   Art. 96 Cotonou Agreement.  
84   Art. 96.2(a) Cotonou Agreement.  
85   Interview with Rafael de Bustamante Tello, op.cit. 
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On the other hand, ICC clauses have not been included in agreements with 
the EU’s strategic partners, such as the US, China or Russia. The differentiated 
treatment of certain states does not only limit the effectiveness of the EU’s support for 
the ICC in the bilateral relations with these countries as diplomacy bears the palm, 
the EU is also being criticised for applying a double standard.86 Therefore, European 
institut
 be described as influential, the analysis of the use of ICC 
lauses has revealed the limits of the EU’s differentiated approach to broaden the 
 
3.2  
me Statute system by reinforcing its 
coope
instruments of 200288 and 200389 set up the European Network of Contact Points and 
                                                
ions, in order to promote the ICC effectively and credibly, have to legitimate 
this differentiated treatment, especially vis-à-vis less important countries.  
This section has shown that the EU has made rapid strides to become a vocal 
promoter of the ICC worldwide after the entry into force of the Rome Statute. 
Although further convergence might prove helpful, the ratification of the Rome 
Statute by the 27th EU member state in 2009 has definitely overcome a major 
challenge to the credibility of the EU’s external policy. Whereas the impact of 
political declarations remains limited, the EU’s permanent dialogue with its partners 
has (at least partially) contributed to the broadening of the Rome Statute system. 
The case of transatlantic relations has illustrated to what extent diplomatic 
considerations constrain effectiveness. Whilst the EU’s financial support for 
handpicked NGOs can
c
Rome Statute system.  
Strengthening the Rome Statute system 
 
The EU aims at strengthening the Ro
ration with the ICC. EU-ICC cooperation covers a wide spectrum of legal, 
political, financial and practical instruments.  
Apart from tools that facilitate the EU-wide execution of arrest warrants,87 the 
Council has enacted a number of legal instruments dealing explicitly with cross-
national cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of mass atrocities. Council 
 
86   R.  Brody,  Playing it firm, fair and smart: The EU and the ICC’s indictment of Bashir, ISS 
Opinion, March 2009, p. 2, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/EU_ICC_Bashir.pdf.  
87   Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 
2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member 
States, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:190:0001:0018:EN:PDF.  
88   Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2002/494/JHA of 13 June 2002 setting up 
a European network of contact points in respect of persons responsible for genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:167:0001:0002:EN:PDF. 
89    Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2003/335/JHA of 8 May 2003 on the 
investigation and prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:118:0012:0012:EN:PDF. 
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attest to the EU’s attempts to institutionalise regular communication channels to 
facilitate cooperation with the ICC. In practice, however, smaller member states 
someti
y spark doubts on the 
indepe
sional’s Programme, which amounts to € 500,000,94 appears to be 
insignif
mes lack the necessary resources to engage fully in the network.90 
W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t r u m e n t s ,  o f f i c i a l  E U  d e c l a r a t i o n s  o n  c o n c r e t e  
decisions of the ICC or its Prosecutor are very numerous.91 These declarations may 
sometimes be controversial: if phrased in ambiguous terms,92 the EU’s well-
intentioned support for concrete decisions of the ICC ma
ndence of the ICC and thus be counter-productive.  
The financial contributions of EU member states account for more than half of 
the total assessed contributions to the Court (that is, more than € 50 million per 
year).93 In comparison, the EU’s annual contribution to the Court’s Internship and 
Visiting Profes
icant.  
In 2006, the EU concluded a co-operation and assistance agreement with the 
ICC to allow for practical cooperation.95 This agreement provides, inter alia, for the 
regular exchange of information. However, data protection concerns constrain a 
more effective form of cooperation between the EU and the ICC: the security 
arrangement concerning the exchange of classified information was finalised as late 
as 2008 and is rarely applied in practice due to its burdensome procedure.96 
Additionally, contrary to the ICC’s hopes, the co-operation and assistance agree-
ment does not provide for an EU-wide victim and witness protection programme. Up 
to present, only four member states have concluded witness protection and 
relocation agreements and only five have entered into enforcement agreements 
with the Court.97 Additionally, Eurojust has only been associated loosely with the 
                                                 
Intervie 90   w with Rafael de Bustamante Tello, op.cit. 
nion,  International Criminal Court, http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/ 
5_en.htm. 
93  
96  
97   nited Kingdom, in 2007, had been the first states to sign 
91   European  U
articleslist_t3
92   See for the situation in Darfur Council of the European Union, The EU and the ICC, op.cit., 
p. 24.  
Ibid., p. 18. 
94   Ibid., p. 17.  
95   International Criminal Court, Agreement between the International Criminal Court and 
the European Union on cooperation and assistance, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ 
6EB80CC1-D717-4284-9B5C-03CA028E155B/140157/ICCPRES010106_English.pdf. 
Interview with Rafael de Bustamante Tello, op.cit. 
Ibid. Austria, in 2005, and the U
enforcement agreements. Belgium, Denmark and Finland signed enforcement 
agreements during the Review Conference on 1 June 2010, see International Criminal 
Court, Enforcement agreements, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/58DCFCB5-73E5-4A3E-
8606-1426473DC289.htm.  
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European Network of Contact Points.98 Europol has not yet been included in the 
Network. Once again, disunity among member states prevents the EU from 
reinfor
essfully institutionalised EU-ICC cooperation to strengthen 
the Rome Statute system.  
3.3  eepening the Rome Statute system 
ning the Rome Statute system, concerns both member 
states 
mentation into 
dome
ed to third countries.103 However, 
practic
                                                
cing its cooperation with the ICC.  
This section has shown that the impact of financial and practical instruments 
to strengthen the Rome Statute system remains very limited due to limited funds, 
data protection concerns and the insistence of member states on national 
competences in this field. Political declarations on concrete decisions of the ICC 
may, if phrased in ambiguous terms, compromise the objective of judicial 
independence of the Court. On a positive note, the set-up of the European Network 
of Contact Point has succ
 
 D
 
The empowerment of national jurisdictions to deal with mass atrocities at the 
domestic level, thus deepe
and third countries.  
As member states have a strong executive and judiciary to prosecute and 
punish war criminals, the only shortcoming remains the lack of imple
stic legislation of the crimes proscribed by the Rome Statute.99  
The EU’s official documents promise third countries technical and financial 
support.100 In practice, the Commission organises lawyer training programmes and 
seminars and hosts workshops and conferences in order to diffuse expertise and 
empower local NGOs and national jurisdictions to deal with mass atrocities.101 To this 
end, the Commission has also set up an EU list of experts.102 Specialists in the field of 
international criminal justice may be second
e shows that this list is ‘a bit dormant’.104 
Additionally, external support remains often too limited to empower the 
countries concerned. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, a 
 
98   Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008 on 
the strengthening of Eurojust and amending Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust 
with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime, Art. 10 and 25.2, http://eur-
32009D0426:EN:NOT. 
CFSP, CP 2003/444/CFSP, AP 2004.  
, op.cit., p. 16.  
ew with Rafael de Bustamante Tello, op.cit. 
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:
99   Interview with Rafael de Bustamante Tello, op.cit. 
100  See CP 2001/443/CFSP, CP 2002/474/
101  Scheipers & Sicurelli, op.cit., p. 613.  
102  Council of the European Union, The EU and the ICC
103  Intervi
104  Ibid.  
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fragile security situation threatens the organisation of fair local proceedings.105 Only 
eight experts have been sent to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the 
framework of the EU’s security sector reform (SSR) mission, deployed in 2005.106 In 
order to serve international justice, a more holistic, costly and dangerous 
engag
oaden, strengthen and deepen the Rome Statute system is far 
om accomplished. It can gain in effectiveness if the particularities of the ICC are 
 
4. 
hapter applies the yardstick developed in chapter 2 to assess to what 
xtent the ICC succeeds in fighting impunity. It analyses input- and output-oriented 
 
4.1  
The input-oriented core elements are the institutional set-up, socio-democratic 
pendence from political interference.  
nal legal capacity110 and its own funds.111  A 
                                                
ement on the part of the EU and the international community in general – 
beyond the diffusion of expertise – would be necessary.  
This section has shown that the deepening of the Rome Statute system is one 
of the most difficult tasks promoters of the ICC face. Given the numerous challenges, 
the EU’s mission to br
fr
taken into account.  
 
The hydra-headed challenges to the ICC: mission impossible? 
 
This c
e
elements.  
Input-oriented elements  
 
legitimacy and inde
 
Institutional set-up  
 
This section highlights the Court’s legal status, its competences and its 
composition to illustrate a dilemma that concerns the very foundations of the Court’s 
architecture. Contrary to the ICTY, a temporary ad hoc tribunal established by and 
subsidiary to the Security Council,107 the ICC, created outside the UN framework,108 is 
a permanent109 court with internatio
 
105  Song, op.cit. 
106  Council of the European Union, EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage. 
aspx?id=909&lang=En. 
107  See Art. 13bis, 13ter, 16, 27, 34 ICTY Statute.  
108  See Art. 2 Rome Statute.  
109  Art. 1 Rome Statute.  
110  Art. 4 Rome Statute.  
111  Art. 113, 115 Rome Statute.  
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priori, 
 take at least120 another seven years before the ICC can 
exerci
sition legitimates any 
interna
e most advanced institutional player in 
interna ional criminal justice. Still, even the best institutional set-up remains a dead 
ic legitimacy.  
                                                
these characteristics increase the independence of the Court, which is crucial 
for its acceptance (see section 3.1).  
At the same time, the competences of the Court illustrate that it remains a 
‘product of concessions and trade-offs’112: whereas its competences ratione 
temporis113 and ratione personae114 are not very controversial, its competence 
ratione loci is based on the territoriality115 and the active personality116 principles and 
excludes the passive personality principle. Finally, its competence ratione 
materiae117  is restricted by the opt-out clause on war crimes118. The dilemma to 
strengthen the Court while achieving the broadest possible support has 
accompanied the ICC since its beginning and affects attempts to reform the system: 
although the 2010 Review Conference succeeded in agreeing on a definition of the 
crime of aggression,119 it will
se its jurisdiction in this field. Thus, numerous concessions continue to weaken 
the overall effectiveness of the Court.  
As to its composition, equitable geographical representation is a stated 
objective of the states parties.121 This multi-national compo
tional institution but cultural and language barriers as well as different legal 
backgrounds122 inevitably reduce efficiency (see section 4.2).  
This section has shown that, despite the numerous concessions necessary to 
increase its geographical reach, the ICC is th
t
letter if it lacks socio-democrat
 
Socio-democratic legitimacy  
 
In order to assess the socio-democratic legitimacy of the ICC, this section 
addresses the ratification rate of the Rome Statute and monitoring mechanisms.  
The ratification rate is arguably the most important indicator for the Court’s 
democratic legitimacy. Different criteria may be taken into account to approach 
 
112  A. Cassese et al., “The Rome Statute: A Tentative Assessment”, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. 1913. 
113  Art. 11 Rome Statute.  
114  Art. 12 Rome Statute.  
115  Art. 12.2(a) Rome Statute.  
116  Art. 12.2(b) Rome Statute.  
117  Art. 5 Rome Statute.  
118  Art. 124 Rome Statute. The 2010 Review Conference decided not to delete this article.  
119  Art. 8bis Rome Statute.  
120  See the burdensome procedural provisions in Art. 15bis paragraphs 2 and 3 Rome Statute.  
121  Art. 36.8(a)(ii), 44.2 Rome Statute. 
122  Art. 36.8(a)(i) Rome Statute.  
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this term. A realist view on international relations would probably focus on the 
number of states represented and find that 112 out of 192 UN member states, that is 
58.3 percent, have ratified the Rome Statute. Differentiating between single states, it 
could also point to the fact that three of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council have not ratified the Rome Statute (the US, Russia and China). It may also 
refer to the geographical distribution of states parties and establish that states from 
Latin A
 values are significantly lower than the number of 112 states parties might 
indicat
achievement. The ongoing ratification process, despite its 
geogr
tary and organisational but also ‘constitutional’ control. 
merica, Europe and sub-Saharan Africa are well represented, whereas Asia 
and Northern Africa are clearly underrepresented.123  
In contrast, a liberal view on international relations would probably point to 
the world population indirectly represented by the states parties.124 In September 
2010, states parties accounted for roughly 2,071 million people.125 This number equals 
about 30 percent of the estimated world population of 6,865 million126 people. These 
percentage
e and underline the underrepresentation of the biggest nations such as China 
and India.  
A comparison with the ICTY, set up by the Security Council within the UN 
framework, confirms that, irrespective of the criteria used, the ICC is still far from 
being universal. Nevertheless, considering the slow ratification process of other 
international agreements, the ratification of the Rome Statute by 112 states in twelve 
years constitutes a major 
aphical imbalances, increases the universality and the democratic legitimacy 
of the Court significantly. 
The main monitoring organ of the Registry, the Office of the Prosecutor and 
the Chambers is the Assembly of States Parties (ASP)127. Inter alia, the ASP decides on 
the budget,128 and elects129 and removes130 both judges and the Prosecutor. In the 
aftermath of the first Review Conference131, it adopts amendments132 and thus 
exercises not only budge
                                                 
International  Criminal  Court,  The  123   States Parties to the Rome Statute, http://www.icc-
125    IA, World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
126    u, World Population Projection, http://www.census.gov/ipc/ 
l. 
te. 
  
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties. 
124  In contrast, NGOs represent the global demos only imperfectly, see Glasius, op.cit., p. 43. 
Own calculation based on C
publications/the-world-factbook.  
United States Census Burea
www/popclockworld.htm
127  Art. 112.6 Rome Statute.  
128  Art. 112.2(d) Rome Statute.  
129  Art. 36.6, 42.4 Rome Statu
130  Art. 46.2 Rome Statute.  
131  Art. 123.1 Rome Statute.  
132  Art. 121.3 Rome Statute.
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Additio
n rate of the Rome 
Statute and regular control by the Assembly of States Parties contribute to the 
y of this young Court.  
trality of the judges and the Prosecutor, examines the trigger 
mecha
the inevitable political 
conse
                                                
nally, an independent auditor annually checks the records, books and 
accounts of the Court.133  
This section has demonstrated that the increasing ratificatio
relatively good socio-democratic legitimac
 
Independence from political interference 
 
This section looks at the independence of the Court, crucial for its recognition 
as being super partes and thus its effectiveness. It gives an overview of the provisions 
safeguarding the neu
nisms to open investigations and hints at the hierarchy between the ICC and 
national jurisdictions.  
Legal provisions safeguard the personal independence of the eighteen 
judges134 and of the Prosecutor.135 The belief in complete judicial impartiality may be 
‘overly optimistic’,136 and the Prosecutor is hardly blind to 
quences of his actions.137 At present, however, there is no proof whatsoever of 
partiality on the part of neither the Prosecutor nor the judges. 
The Rome Statute provides for three trigger mechanisms for the exercise of 
jurisdiction.138 First, a state party may refer a situation to the Prosecutor.139 This 
constellation reveals the impact of dynamic interpretations in public international 
law. The drafters of the Rome Statute conceived this mechanism for referrals of a 
situation in a third country and did not contemplate referrals of an internal 
situation.140 However, the first three investigations in Uganda, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic are based on self-referrals 
by the respective governments. Self-referrals generally signalise the willingness of the 
governments to cooperate, essential for the effective working of the Court. Yet, they 
also entail legal and political problems. A legal issue, which is still unresolved,141 refers 
to the question of whether the Court may reject the referral on the ground that the 
 
tatute. 
136   ed Crime – Futures for International Criminal 
137    tional Criminal Court”, 
ternational Law, vol. 99, no. 2, 2005, p. 385.  
141   atzger, Internationales und Europäisches Strafrecht, Baden-Baden 
133  Art. 118 Rome Statute.  
134  Art. 36.9, 40.3, 41, 46, 48.2 Rome S
135  Art. 43.3-5, 46, 48 Rome Statute.  
M.  Findlay,  Governing through Globalis
Justice, Cullompton, Willan, 2008, p. 117.  
M. Arsanjani & M. Reisman, “The Law-in-Action of the Interna
American Journal of In
138  Art. 13 Rome Statute.  
139  Art. 13(a), 14 Rome Statute.  
140  Arsanjani & Reisman, op.cit., p. 387.  
Song, op.cit.; see H. S
Nomos, 2008, p. 219.  
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state is not ‘unwilling or unable’142 to carry out the investigation or prosecution or 
whether self-referrals automatically preclude such a test. The answer to this legal 
question is of particular political importance. If governments do not prevail in an 
ongoing conflict, they might use self-referrals to externalise their domestic 
problems.143 In such a politicised environment, ‘the failure of governments will simply 
become the failure of the ICC’,144 which itself cannot work effectively without the 
extrad
010 
Review
                                                
ition of the individuals. In Uganda, for example, not a single arrest warrant has 
been respected.145 The practice of self-referrals, not foreseen by the drafters of the 
Rome Statute, may therefore entrap the Court in intractable internal conflicts.  
Second, the Security Council, if it so decides by ‘an affirmative vote of nine 
members including the concurring votes of the permanent members’,146 may refer a 
situation to the Prosecutor147 or also defer an investigation or prosecution for a period 
of twelve months.148 This mechanism may be a mixed blessing for the ICC. On the 
one hand, the ICC needs the politico-legal support of the Security Council and the 
practical support of UN peacekeeping personnel in order to have its decisions 
enforced. On the other hand, a referral by the Security Council is a highly political 
decision. Referrals may be interpreted as a case of victors’ justice, especially when 
the Security Council, with the (tacit) support of the three veto powers that are not 
states parties to the Rome Statute, refers the situation in another non-state party, for 
example Sudan149, to the Prosecutor. The past deferrals of the investigation or 
prosecution150 were similarly controversial. This does not bode well for UN-ICC 
cooperation with regard to the crime of aggression, as states parties at the 2
 Conference strengthened the role of the Security Council.151 Since the threat 
of interference remains a ‘rightful concern’,152 the ICC faces the dilemma that the 
support by an actor it needs to enforce its decisions questions its independence.  
 
isman, op.cit., pp. 392, 394.  
145   ww.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20 
200204. 
arter (UNC).  
.  
149    (2005), 
150  
 (2003), 
EN/N03/394/51/PDF/N0339451.pdf.  
ssment, op.cit., p. 1907.  
142  Art. 17.1(a) Rome Statute.  
143  Arsanjani & Re
144  Ibid., p. 395.  
See International Criminal Court, Uganda, http://w
and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%
146  Art. 27.3 United Nations Ch
147  Art. 13(b) Rome Statute
148  Art. 16 Rome Statute.  
See United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1593 of 31 March 2005, S/RES/1593
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/292/73/PDF/N0529273.pdf.  
See United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1422 of 12 July 2002, S/RES/1422 (2002), 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/477/61/PDF/N0247761.pdf; and 
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1487 of 12 June 2003, S/RES/1487
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/G
151  See Art. 15bis paragraphs 6-8 Rome Statute.  
152  Cassese et al., Tentative Asse
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Third, the Prosecutor may open investigations proprio motu.153 This provision, 
which constitutes an innovation in international law, was conceived as a non-
political trigger mechanism to enhance the independence of the Court.154 Its 
exercise is controlled by the pre-trial chamber,155 which authorised the first proprio 
motu 
arty is ‘unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the 
investi
 personnel and the trigger mechanisms to safeguard the 
dependence of the Court from political interference. However, self-referrals, as well 
curity Council, may contribute to the politicisation of 
the Court’s work. 
 
 
rt deals with the three output-oriented elements: efficiency, co-
opera
 use of resources, that is the costs and the time needed 
to reso
investigations on 31 March 2010156, demonstrating that the Court is willing to 
initiate investigations without the explicit referral by a state party or the Security 
Council.  
With regard to the hierarchy between the ICC and national jurisdictions, the 
ICC is a tribunal of last resort.157 According to the principle of complementarity158, it is 
the first responsibility of states to prosecute suspects. Nevertheless, the Court may 
determine whether a state p
gation or prosecution’159 and thus decides on whether is has jurisdiction with 
respect to a certain situation or not. This Kompetenz-Kompetenz increases the 
independence of the Court.  
This section, completing the evaluation of input-related elements, has 
demonstrated that the Rome Statute provides for the necessary provisions on the 
neutrality of the
in
as re- and deferrals by the Se
4.2 Output-oriented elements  
This pa
tion with relevant partners and the potential contribution to conflict resolution.  
 
Efficiency 
 
Efficiency refers to the
lve a case (see section 2.2). Applying these criteria to the ICC, this section 
                                                 
Art. 13(c), 15 Rome Statute.   153  
 Assessment, op.cit., p. 1907.  
ute.  
t, ICC judges grant the Prosecutor’s request, http://www.icc-
i
157  
159  
154  Cassese et al., Tentative
155  See Art. 15.4 Rome Stat
156  International Criminal Cour
cpi.nt/NR/exeres/D81AA5AF-CD76-4B3C-A4FC-AA7819569B44.htm. 
Satzger, op.cit., p. 219.  
158  Art. 17 Rome Statute.  
Art. 17.1(a) Rome Statute.  
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investigates whether the Court is in fact a ‘thriving institution [that] continues to gain 
inexorable momentum’.160  
The budget of the ICC, which has increased from € 80.5 million in 2007 to 
€ 104.6 million in 2010,161 finances a ‘large bureaucracy’.162 Its internal organisation is 
burdensome and the use of numerous forms and multiple working languages 
protracts the duration of procedures to what an official calls a ‘scandalous’ period of 
time.163 A comparison with the ICTY may put this claim into perspective: the ICTY, 
which has indicted 161 persons to date, sentenced six individuals in the first six years 
of operation.164 The ICC has been up and running for seven years and has not 
concluded a single trial. The recent opening of investigations into 2007 post-election 
violence in Kenya may illustrate why there is ‘some room for speeding up 
proceedings’:165 the Prosecutor requested to open investigations on 26 November 
2009 but it was not until 31 March 2010 that his request was granted.166 This means 
that it took the pre-trial chamber four months to decide on the mere opening of 
investigations. Stakes are high as the next elections in Kenya are scheduled for 2012. 
Admin
er increasing their contributions to the 
ourt.168  
ion has shown that the current organisation of the Court limits its 
efficie
h all parts is the 
‘bigge
                                                
istrative procedures have to be streamlined if the Court wants to win the trust 
of states parties reluctant to yield sovereignty.167 The conclusion of the first trial could 
also encourage states parties to reconsid
C
This sect
ncy. Confronted with this situation, the relevant partners of the ICC may be less 
inclined to cooperate fully with the Court.  
 
Co-operation  
 
Practitioners agree that ensuring good cooperation wit
st challenge for the ICC’.169 The reason for this is the ‘indirect enforcement 
model’170 that the ICC is based on. It lacks a constabulary and subpoena powers. 
 
160  W.  Schabas,  The enigma of the International Criminal Court's success, 2006, 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_government/icc_3278.jsp.  
161  Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Budget & Finance, http://www.iccnow.org/ 
ew with interviewee B, senior official at the ICC, The Hague, 24 March 2010. 
., p. 121.  
166   uest, http://www.icc-
3C-A4FC-AA7819569B44.htm. 
 Tello, op.cit. 
e A, op.cit. 
.  
?mod=budgetbackground. 
162  Intervi
163  Ibid.  
164  Findlay, op.cit
165  Song, op.cit. 
International Criminal Court, ICC judges grant the Prosecutor’s req
cpi.int/NR/exeres/D81AA5AF-CD76-4B
167  Interview with interviewee B, op.cit. 
168  Interview with Rafael de Bustamante
169  Interview with interviewe
170  Satzger, op.cit., p. 197
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Unlike the ICTY,171 it does not have primacy over national courts. Therefore, 
cooperation with states, NGOs, the UN and the ICTY is vital.  
Legal provisions on cooperation with states w e r e  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  s t a t e  
sovereignty concerns. In order to make universal ratification of the Rome Statute 
possible, its drafters made the ICC entirely dependent on the cooperation of states 
parties,172 especially with regard to surrender requests173 and the collection of 
evidence.174 The obligation to surrender persons to the Court175 is the most important 
concretisation of the general obligation to cooperate.176 The Court has requested 
the su
 important their own neutrality is 
to ma
rrender of thirteen individuals,177 eight of whom are still at large.178 In 
Uganda,179 not a single of the five arrest warrants issued in 2005 has been respected 
and the situation in Sudan180 is similarly difficult. As ‘cooperation with states parties is 
not sufficient’,181 the Court faces serious challenges in establishing itself as a credible 
institution.  
Cooperation with NGOs is problematic for both sides. The Court may receive 
valuable information from NGOs,182 but it also has to defend impartiality at all costs 
(see section 4.1). Humanitarian NGOs underline how
intain their work on the ground.183 They see the expulsion of humanitarian aid 
workers after the issuance of an arrest warrant against al Bashir as a shot across the 
bow and warn against an ‘intimate relationship’.184 As both sides keep a watchful 
eye on their impartiality, cooperation with the ICC is less effective than the common 
interest in the fight against impunity might suggest.  
                                                 
Art. 9.2 ICTY Statute.  
Art. 86-111 Rome Statute.  
171  
172  
 Statute.  
euve, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2003, p. 86, this is “le 
176  
178   ases, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+ 
s/Situations/Situation+ICC+0204/Related+Cases/ICC+0204+0105/Uganda.htm. 
tuations/Situation+ICC+0205. 
182  
183   itarian NGOs and the ICC, Skylight Pictures, 23 March 2010. 
173  Art. 90.6, 98, 87.7 Rome
174  Art. 93 Rome Statute.  
175  Art. 89 Rome Statute. According to A.-M. La Rosa, Juridictions pénales internationales: La 
procédure et la pr
chaînon le plus fragile de la procédure penale internationale”.  
Art. 86 Rome Statute.  
177  The arrest warrant against Mr Lukwiya, who deceased in 2006, is unconsidered.  
See International Criminal Court, All C
and+Cases/Cases. 
179  See International Criminal Court, Uganda, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+ 
and+Case
180  International  Criminal  Court,  Darfur, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+ 
Cases/Si
181  Interview with interviewee B, op.cit. 
The NGO Witness, for example, provided video footage used in the ICC trial against Mr 
Lubanga. 
MacArthur Foundation, Human
184  Ibid.  
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As regards the UN,185 the relationship of the ICC with a particular subsidiary 
body of the Security Council, namely the ICTY, is surprisingly difficult. It is true that 
both institutions are very different: the permanent nature of the ICC and the 
complementarity principle of the Rome Statute are two main features that explain 
the singularity of the ICC with regard to the ICTY, to be phased out possibly in 2014.186 
However, the fact that the ICTY has seventeen years of experience in this area 
suggests that the ICC could learn a lot from its ‘sister court’187. The dispute about 
witness proofing, that is the preparation of the witness for the trial testimony during a 
meeting with the counsel, is characteristic of tensions in the relationship between the 
ICTY and the ICC: at the ICTY, witness proofing had been practiced for a decade,188 
when the ICC dismissed this practice in a controversial decision.189 Irrespective of 
whether this dismissal was legally justified or not, the controversy it provoked illustrates 
the need for more inter-institutional communication. An expert on this topic, warning 
that t
‘stepsisters’ closer to one another.  
is section has shown that cooperation of the ICC with relevant partners, so 
e working of the Court, is difficult in practice. Cooperation with 
states 
                                                
here is ‘no need to reinvent the wheel’, suggests that a digest of ICTY 
jurisprudence should inspire the ICC190 and that the relationship between the ICC 
and the ICTY should be formalised further via one-year exchange programmes and 
the organisation of mini-conferences for the staff of both courts.191 This could help to 
bring the 
Th
vital for the effectiv
parties is not sufficient, concerns about impartiality on both sides hamper 
cooperation with NGOs and finally, the relationship with the ICTY is surprisingly 
strained. 
 
Conflict resolution  
 
Whether or not the ICC fulfils its core function, that is puts an end to impunity 
and contributes to the prevention of the most heinous crimes,192 is difficult to assess 
for one empirical and one theoretical reason.  
 
185  Art. 5, 15, 18 of the 2004 Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court 
d Nations, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/916FC6A2-7846-4177-A5EA-
letion Strategy, http://www.icty.org/sid/10016.  
lor,  Witness Proofing in International Criminal Law, International Society for the 
, p. 2, http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/2008/Taylor.pdf.  
192  
and the Unite
5AA9B6D1E96C/0/ICCASP3Res1_English.pdf, provide for the exchange of information 
between the ICC and the UN. 
186  ICTY, Comp
187  Song, op.cit.  
188  D.  Tay
Reform of Criminal Law, 2008
189  Ibid., p. 4. 
190  Interview with interviewee E, op.cit.  
191  Ibid.   
Preamble 5 Rome Statute.  
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First, as no trial has been concluded yet, the impact of the Court on the 
ground is still ‘unclear’.193 Lack of empirical research194 and the dependence on 
exogenous variables such as the degree of military, political and economic 
commitment of the world community make it difficult to evaluate whether the 
permanent Court really exercises a ‘huge preventive impact’195 on leaders 
worldwide by stigmatising criminal conduct.  
Second, academic debate196 has concentrated on the discussion of ‘peace 
vs. justice’, especially in view of the difficult peace talks in Northern Uganda and of 
the expulsion of humanitarian aid workers from Darfur. Some argue that ‘justice 
sustain
ever, this paper can discuss the implications of this debate at a more 
concre
what extent the ICC combines elements from both models. The last decades have 
 as set out in 
     
s peace’.197 Others focus on food and security as the basic needs of the local 
population and warn that punishing violations may ‘alienate actors who are also 
needed in building peace’.198 ‘Peace’ and ‘justice’ remain blurry concepts and the 
catchword ‘peace vs. justice’ is an ‘umbrella term for a debate with many different 
answers’199 – a debate this paper cannot engage in to assess the contribution of the 
ICC to conflict resolution.  
How
te level and thus deal with the potential of the ICC to resolve conflicts. It first 
introduces the models of retributive and restorative justice, and it then assesses to 
witnessed the emergence of two types of politico-legal reactions to massive human 
the retributive200 and the restorative201 justice model, rights violations: 
Figure 2.  
                                            
Interview with interviewee B, op.cit. 
See Arsanjani & Reisman, op.cit., p. 403, Findlay, op.cit., p. 121. 
L. More
193  
194  
195   no-Ocampo, in A Conversation with Luis Moreno-Ocampo of the ICC, Harvard 
196  
197  
198  
199  
200  
5, p. 196; M. Findlay & R. Henham, Beyond 
Kennedy School, Carr Centre for Human Rights Policy, 12 January 2010. 
See C. Albin, “Peace vs. Justice – and Beyond”, in J. Bercovitch et al. (eds.), The SAGE 
Handbook of Conflict Resolution, Los Angeles/London, Sage, 2009, p. 580.  
Song, op.cit.   
Albin, op.cit., p. 581.  
Ibid., p. 580.  
Findlay, op.cit., pp. 95, 98; La Rosa, op.cit., p. 456. For criticism see S. Bartelt, “Die Zulässig-
keit von Wahrheitskommissionen im Lichte des neuen Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs”, 
Archiv des Völkerrechts, vol. 43, no. 2, 200
Punishment: Achieving International Criminal Justice, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010, pp. 121-122; M. Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after 
Genocide and Mass Violence, Boston, Beacon Press, 1998, p. 25; S. Parmentier, M. Valiñas 
& E. Weitekamp, “How to repair the harm after violent conflict in Bosnia? Results of a 
population-based survey”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, vol. 27, no. 1, 2009, 
p. 44.  
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The ICC itself, which may refrain from exercising its jurisdiction and allow for the 
set-up of national truth and reconciliation commissions  granting amnesty,202 
combines elements of both models. The Rome Statute is influenced by the 
International Military Tribunals, the ICTY and the ICTR203 and follows, in principle, the 
retributive model. However, whereas the victim was a ‘passive object’204 before the 
ject matter’205 before the ICC.  
 
Figure 2: Retributive and restorative justice model 
 
ICTY, three considerations make it a ‘potential sub
                                                 
1  Bartelt,  op.cit., p. 188; J. Dugard, “Possible Conflicts of Jurisdictions with Truth 
Co
Cour
ive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda”, African Affairs, vol. 103, 
 7 ; Findlay, op.cit., p. 127.  
202  As “international law does not – yet – prohibit the granting of amnesty for international 
crimes” (Dugard, op.cit., p. 698), the Prosecutor may use his discretionary power not to 
”, Art. 15, 51.1(c) Rome Statute, see 
 Nuremberg to Rome”, op.cit., p. 3.  
tinne, “The Status and Role of the Victim”, in A. Cassese et al. 
205   99.  
20
mmissions”, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
t: A Commentary, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 694; Findlay, op.cit., p. 98; 
P. McCold & T. Wachtel, In Pursuit of Paradigm: A Theory of Restorative Justice, 2003, p. 1, 
http://www.realjustice.org/uploads/article_pdfs/paradigm.pdf; H. Steiner & P. Alston, 
International Human Rights in Context – Law, Politics, Morals, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2000, 2nd edition, p. 1217. For criticism see Bartelt, op.cit., p. 196; A. Corey & S. 
Joireman, “Retribut
no. 410, 2004, p. 6
initiate an investigation “in the interests of justice
Bartelt,  op.cit.,  p. 216. Other normative links to allow for considerations of political 
opportunity and to accept the granting of amnesty include Art. 16, 17.1(b), 20 Rome 
Statute. 
203  Cassese, “From
204  C. Jorda & J. de Hemp
(eds.),  The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 1389.  
Ibid., p. 13
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Source: author’s own chart. 
 
First, the ‘Victims and Witnesses Unit’, which assists victims and witnesses that 
appear before the Court,206 and the ‘Outreach Unit’, which implies local populations 
in interactive sessions and promotes the understanding of the ICC via the radio, short 
message services and word-of-mouth communication, seem to fulfil their respective 
tasks successfully.207 
Second, the right of victims to participate in proceedings208 is a major 
innovation in international criminal law. Findlay welcomes this development, claiming 
that international criminal justice must be ‘legitimated through the interests of victim 
communities’.209 In particular, Findlay and Henham invite judges to use their 
discretional power210 to actively include victims and witnesses ‘according to their 
outcome expectations’211 by giving an ‘equal effect to lay and professional 
voices’.212 In general, the greater use of the judges’ discretionary power to focus on 
the inclusion of victims seems to be an adequate instrument to engage with 
restorative concerns. However, concerns about efficiency and the rights of the 
accused must be taken seriously. As victims become ‘quasi a second prosecutor’,213 
the inclusion of victim communities may protract court proceedings further. In fact, 
ICC of
s216 is another innovation in 
international criminal law.217 This award may be made against a convicted person218 
                                                
ficials do not seem to appreciate that the representation of 500 victims by two 
lawyers in the Katanga trial led to delays in the Court proceedings.214 In addition, 
judges have to take the ‘fragile equilibrium between the parties to the 
proceedings’215 into account and strike a balance between the effectiveness and 
the fairness of the trial on the one side and legitimate concerns of victim 
communities on the other side. The difficult challenge the ICC faces is to harmonise 
the retributive and the restorative model in a workable way. 
Third, the possibility to award reparations to victim
 
rt,  Outreach Report 2009, pp. 1, 4, 20, 79; http://www.icc-
238-AA64-D5AB32D33247/281271/OR_2009_ENG_ 
 Statute.  
., p. 109.  
es A & B, op.cit. 
it., p. 1413.  
it., p. 453.  
206  Art. 43.6 Rome Statute.  
207  International  Criminal  Cou
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/8A3D8107-5421-4
web.pdf. 
208  Art. 68.3 Rome
209  Findlay, op.cit
210  Findlay & Henham, op.cit., p. 177.  
211  Ibid., p. 176.  
212  Ibid., p. 182.  
213  Song, op.cit. 
214  Interview with interviewe
215  Jorda & de Hemptinne, op.c
216  Art. 75 Rome Statute.  
217  La Rosa, op.c
218  Art. 75.2 Rome Statute.  
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or thr
al.  
The procedural rules of the Rome Statute constitute a decisive advance for 
tims and thus for the potential of the ICC to resolve conflicts. 
the ICC has learned the lessons of the ICTY, which was heavily 
criticised for neglecting elements of restorative justice.223 The collection of empirical 
a vocal promoter of the ICC. The EU’s internal policy now allows the EU 
to con
           
ough the Trust Fund,219 which is to be financed mainly220 by voluntary 
contributions. The Trust Fund should help victims ‘to start a new life’.221 Since it has 
already created ‘expectations among the victims and theirs advocates’,222 a well-
functioning reparations mechanism seems to be of major importance for the 
acceptance of the Court by local populations and thus for the contribution of the 
ICC to reconciliation and conflict resolution in gener
the inclusion of vic
Experts confirm that 
data on the impact of the ICC on the ground will tell whether the ICC will be a ‘real 
force for peace and reconciliation’ in the future.224 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
To what extent does the EU’s support for the ICC qualify as a success story? 
Having elaborated a tailor-made yardstick to measure effectiveness, this paper 
showed that the EU’s support for the broadening, strengthening and deepening of 
the Rome Statute system has become more coherent and more effective in the last 
decade. The EU shed the bystander status that it held at the Rome Conference and 
emerged as 
tribute to the broadening of the Rome Statute system although the different-
tiated treatment of strategic partners questions its credibility. Concerns about state 
sovereignty seriously limit the effectiveness of politico-legal, financial and practical 
instruments to strengthen the Rome Statute system. Lacking a more holistic approach 
to the deepening of the Rome Statute system, the EU’s technical assistance remains 
suboptimal. 
Although the ICC is a product of concessions and trade-offs to reach 
universality, its relatively advanced institutional set-up, its growing socio-democratic 
legitimacy and its relative independence from political interference (despite the 
practice of self-referrals and interventions by the Security Council) pave the way for 
a new powerful actor in the field of international criminal justice. However, the 
                                      
 75.2, 79 Rome Statute.  
220  Arsanjani & Reisman, op.cit., p. 401.  
219  Art.
221  Song, op.cit. 
222  Arsanjani & Reisman, op.cit., p. 402.  
223  Interview with interviewee D, senior official at the ICTY, The Hague, 24 March 2010.  
224  Jorda & de Hemptinne, op.cit., p. 1416.  
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assessment that the Court still lacks efficiency does not bode well for its difficult 
cooperation with states, NGOs and the ICTY. Although it might still be too early to tell, 
nd penalise the crimes 
by 2017. As to its external policy, the 
  missions.  
independence and organisational 
spects, should take a more ‘critical position towards the ICC’,225 openly 
                                                
elements of restorative justice, if implemented despite certain reluctance among 
practitioners, may enhance the potential of the ICC to resolve conflicts. The 
implementation of the results of the 2010 Review Conference will give direction to 
the future of the ‘justice start-up’ and will indicate whether the ICC can overcome 
the hydra-headed challenges it is confronted with.  
The EU faces a tough balancing act when contributing to the ICC’s fight 
against impunity. Based on the analysis in this paper, one may conclude that the EU 
should consider the following six policy recommendations to make its support for the 
ICC more effective.  
1)  In order to broaden the Rome Statute system further, the EU should ensure that 
all member states ratify the relevant agreements a
proscribed by the Rome Statute under domestic legislation. Furthermore, a 
common EU position on the crime of aggression would be helpful to activate 
the Court’s jurisdiction, at least partially, 
E U  s h o u l d  t a k e  m o r e  s t e p s  t o  ‘ s p e a k  w i t h  o n e  v o i c e ’  a t  t h e  A S P  a n d  
reconsider its current use of ICC clauses. Maintaining the support for relevant 
NGOs, the EU might also consider intensifying its cooperation with regional 
powers such as Japan or Mexico.  
2)  When strengthening the Rome Statute system, the EU should envisage closer 
cooperation of the European Network of Contact Points with Europol, Eurojust 
and Common Security and Defence Policy
3)  In order to deepen the Rome Statute system, the EU should make use of its list 
of experts and prioritise technical assistance and capacity-building in its post-
conflict security sector reform initiatives.  
4)  The EU, distinguishing between judicial 
a
encourage a closer cooperation between the ICC and the ICTY and 
emphasise the importance of bureaucratic efficiency.  
5)  New forms of support for the ICC could include contributions to research 
institutes to gather objective empirical data on the Court’s impact on the 
ground and to the voluntary Trust Fund.  
6)  As the Stockholm Programme only contains very vague provisions on the 
ICC,226 the EU should update its strategic documents, especially the 2003 
 
225  Interview with interviewee B, op.cit. 
226  European Council, Notice 2010/C 115/01 of 4 May 2010, The Stockholm Programme – an 
open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, pp. 8, 17, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:115:0001:0038:EN:PDF. 
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Common Position, taking note of the new challenges that have arisen in the 
ince the set-up of the Court.  
rm yardstick 
eight years s
 
Further empirical research on the ICC’s impact on the ground and its 
contribution to the prevention of crimes is needed, especially in response to the 
conclusion of the first trial and in relation to the phasing out of the ad hoc tribunals. 
Additionally, analysing other (international) courts will help craft a unifo
to assess and compare judicial effectiveness. Further research on the EU could 
concentrate on how the set-up of the European External Action Service will affect 
the EU’s support for the ICC. 
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